This article reexamines the problem of labor exploitation in advanced capitalist economies, especially the United States. The article specifies the concept of labor exploitation by using both the Marxian and marginalist notions and measures. The implicit neoclassical presumption of no or little labor exploitation in a capitalist economy is rejected by the results. The alternative heterodox argument of persistent and increasing labor exploitation has been confirmed for contemporary capitalism, particularly for the United States, in recent years.
Labor exploitation is a largely underanalyzed phenomenon within mainstream economics. At best, conventional economic analysis tends to dubiously confine labor exploitation and related economic pathologies in contemporary capitalism to presumably irregular or secondary factor-market structures, above all monopoly or, more precisely, monopsony (Boal and Ranson 1996; Fishback 1998) and other (to use Schumpeter's term) monopoloids, namely, oligopoly and monopolistic or imperfect competition. The implication is thus that competitive factor markets are impervious to this and other similar anomalies. As a result, labor exploitation has been assumed away from these markets and thus from the mainstream capitalist economy and relegated to the inconsequential and residual category (a nuisance or error term). I will show that this approach can be prima facie questionable given the documented presence and pertinence of labor exploitation in modern capitalism as a whole, including free factor markets, not just in monopsony and its various mutants. In light of this situation, this article attempts to help fill in at least some void in this regard by analyzing the presence and intensity of labor exploitation in modern capitalist economies.
For that purpose, the question of defining and measuring labor exploitation is addressed first.
Methodology: Measuring Labor Exploitation by Marxist and Neoclassical Approaches
The question of defining and measuring exploitation in capitalism is complicated but not irresolvable, as shown next. One traditional definition of labor exploitation is the Marxian one, in which this is defined as the ratio between surplus and necessary values, different ratios signifying different degrees of exploitation. Specifically, the degree of exploitation of labor power (Marx 1967: 212-18 ) is given by the rate of surplus value as the proportion between surplus value/product, as materialized surplus labor (or surplus labor time), and necessary value/product, as materialized necessary labor in regard to workers (i.e., the reproduction of the labor power). In Marx's (1967) words, the rate of surplus value is an "exact expression of the degree of exploitation of labor power by capital" (218). Hence, in Marxian economics (Robinson 1942) , the rate of surplus value and the degree of labor exploitation are essentially equivalent categories and so interchangeable expressions. Since in a capitalist economy necessary and surplus labor/product are expressed in monetary terms, the Marxian formula of the degree of exploitation takes the form of a price rate of surplus value. Particularly, the degree of exploitation of productive labor is the rate of surplus value (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 329; also, Kalmans 1997) . Now, for productive laborers, "their rate of exploitation is also the rate of surplus value, because their surplus labor time results in surplus value" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 87) .
The rate of labor exploitation (E) is thus given by S/V = (Va -V)/V, where S is the money equivalent of surplus value/product, V is variable capital invested or the wage bill of productive workers, and Va expresses in monetary terms the value added or created by labor (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 323) . Evidently, the Marxian notion of exploitation is premised on the assumption that Va is generated and yet not fully appropriated by productive workers, as these receive only V, equivalent to necessary product or the value (cost of reproduction) of their labor force, with the difference (S) going to others, including capitalists (profit), rentiers (interest), landowners (rent), unproductive employees (salaries), government (taxes), and so forth. In a Marxian framework, the ratio profits/total capital (wages or variable capital plus all other costs of production or constant capital) gives the conventional profit rate, and Marx was adamant to distinguish this from the degree of exploitation or the rate of surplus value.
As done by Shaikh and Tonak (1994: 323) as well as Kalmans (1997) in this journal, one can also distinguish the price rate of surplus value from the ratio of profits to wages, or profit-type income/wage ratio, insofar as total surplus value (S) is in money form greater than total profits. For, as Marx argued, surplus value includes, alongside profit accruing to capitalist entrepreneurs, other incomes such as interest appropriated by Keynesian rentiers, rent going to landowners, as well as wages or salaries paid to unproductive labor (e.g., the military, police, government bureaucracy, finance, legal services). Thus, any measure of the profit/wage ratio appears as an inadequate proxy of the rate of surplus value, as suggested by their different magnitudes and even historical directions. For example, in the American economy, the rate of surplus value reportedly increased by almost 50 percent, and the profit/wage ratio declined by about 27 percent over the period of 1948-89 (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 222) . While the latter trend can convey the impression of a "wage squeeze" on profits, the former suggests exactly the opposite, namely, the increasing rate of labor exploitation. In this regard, while profit is a derivative of surplus value, the second does not necessarily imply the first to the extent that some portion or all of surplus value can be consumed by unproductive labor and other expenditures before it is calculated as "profit" in capitalist accounting. Reportedly, in the postwar American economy during 1948-89, "a rising portion of surplus value is absorbed in unproductive expenses (so that the portion remaining for profit declines relative to surplus value)" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 222) .
Hence, the wages (advanced in the form of variable capital) of productive workers (V) are smaller than the aggregate sum of wages including the salaries of unproductive workers. Thus, dividing surplus value, that is, profits plus incomes other than productive wages, by total variable capital or wages (and multiplying by a factor of 100) would give the degree (percentage) of labor exploitation. Marx usually assumed the degree of exploitation to be about the order of magnitude 1 or 100 percent at the minimum, with many branches of industry, especially those having easy access to pools of cast-off workers from other sectors, featuring even higher rates, that is, "super exploitation" (Botwinick 1993: 117) . Moreover, recent studies (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 130-31 ) estimate that such "superexploitation" has characterized the American economy in the postwar period 1948-88, as indicated by the rates of exploitation of productive (and unproductive) labor regularly exceeding 1.50 (or 150 percent) and sometimes approaching 2.5 (250 percent). In addition, such estimates suggest a time trend toward the increasing exploitation of both productive and unproductive labor in the postwar U.S. economy; for example, the exploitation rates of productive workers are 1.70 in 1948 , 2.12 in 1964 , 2.26 in 1984 , and 2.44 in 1989 (Shaikh and Tonak 1994 , Table H.1 ).
An alternative notion of labor exploitation can, somewhat ironically, be found in neoclassical (marginalist) economics. This seems ironic because most neoclassical economists would subscribe to the view that labor exploitation, as assumed by Marx, is "established only by means of an abstract deduction of the classic school, and of Ricardo's theory of surplus-value" (Böhm-Bawerk 1929: xxiv) . Nonetheless, in some parts of neoclassical economics, labor exploitation is defined by the inequality between the marginal productivity (the productivity of an additional worker) of workers and wages such that wages are lower. In this case, wages are unfair because workers are "exploited in the sense that they are paid less than the value, which their marginal net product has for the firms, which employ them" (Pigou 1960: 551) . Generally, factor exploitation exists "when a necessary agent of production receives less than its [marginal] product" (Schumpeter 1949: 146) . Specifically, labor or "monopsony exploitation is defined as the difference between the marginal revenue product and the wage as a percentage of the wage" (Fishback 1998: 723) . Alternatively, an equality between wages and the value of marginal product indicates no labor exploitation, and this is precisely what neoclassical theory assumes by its notion of productivity or efficiency wages, with the implication that workers get what they produce and so deserve. Presumably, in the long run, labor and all other factors of production tend to be paid according to their marginal productivity, with workers receiving their efficiency wages. Of course, for radical and generally unorthodox economics, the neoclassical concept of efficiency wages under a capitalist economy is a metaphor at best and an ideological construction at worst. This is especially so insofar as the concept denies the existence of surplus value and thus of labor exploitation by arguing or implying that workers get the "full value" of what they have produced at the margin. A related general neoclassical argument is that by virtue of everyone "getting one's marginal product" (Makowski and Ostroy 2001: 500) in a capitalist economy, a "full appropriation" of returns by production factors, including labor and entrepreneurship, is attained. In a neoclassical scenario, then, labor exploitation tends to vanish, like a pathological partial derivative in mathematical economics or comparative statics (Keynes 1960: 297-98) , by virtue of the operation of the marginal-productivity principle of efficiency wages and some inexorable market forces of supply and demand, free competition, and so on. In a nutshell, the neoclassical presumption is that insofar as the factors of production, including labor, are rewarded in accordance with their marginal value productivity, that is, their productive contribution at the margin, exploitation would be nonexistent or irrelevant in a capitalist (free-market) economy. Neoclassical economics, as well as its extensions in rational choice, including public choice theory, presuming no exploitation implies universally equitable distribution, that is, equity, fairness, or (distributive) "justice for all" under modern capitalism. Namely, "neoclassical models imply that in a well-functioning economy workers [and other factors of production] will receive the value of their marginal product [and so] a fair distribution of rewards" (Fishback 1998: 760) , which suggests the absence of labor exploitation. However, one can suggest separating the economic conception of exploitation from the philosophical, ethical, or political question of a "just wage." Enlightened neoclassical economists argue that the wage-marginal productivity of the labor equation is no more than efficient and an outcome of the competitive market, rather than "just," "desirable," or "good." Furthermore, for them such a nonexploitation condition tends to yield full, natural, or equilibrium employment. One can reply that whereas neoclassical economics might not explicitly contend that distribution in accordance with the value of marginal value is just, the underlying implication is that productive agents get paid what they are worth.
Here I advance a refutation of the neoclassical marginal explanation of factor returns, particularly of no labor exploitation. I argue that labor exploitation exists and is pervasive in today's capitalist economies owing to the persistent differential between wages and the value of the marginal productivity of labor. The above implies the structural persistence of labor exploitation as well as income inequalities in modern capitalism (Botwinick 1993) . Such a condition of worker exploitation seems particularly pronounced in the United States, given the peculiar social structure of its capital accumulation and its labor market, with this structure generally being defined as a set of "socioeconomic institutions that are in operation in a given economy" (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1990: 8) . As shown below, hard-line American capitalism features one of the highest ratios of labor exploitation among major capitalist countries, so U.S. laborers appear to be more exploited than those in most of these countries.
I subject these arguments to scrutiny by confronting them with the evidence on the state and rate of labor exploitation in capitalist economies. In the remainder of the article, first I present such evidence and then consider some unorthodox explanations of the persistence and degree of labor exploitation in today's capitalism, especially in the United States since the 1970s.
The State of Labor Exploitation in Capitalist Economies
In the following, I combine the Marxian concept of labor exploitation with the neoclassical (Pigouvian) notion and measure how the wage is compared with the monetary value of marginal productivity or the marginal revenue product of labor. As hinted before, if the wage is lower than the value of marginal productivity of labor, then this would indicate exploitation. The value of marginal productivity and marginal revenue product (the difference between two amounts of revenue as a result of hiring an extra worker) are quantitatively the same in perfect factor markets and different in imperfect ones (marginal revenue product is lower). In imperfectly or monopolistically competitive factor markets, marginal revenue product serves as the proxy for the marginal-productivity contribution, resulting in higher rates of labor exploitation as well as in lower levels of employment than in a perfectly competitive market. To that extent, under monopolistic or imperfect competition in factor markets, labor as a rule gets less than the value of its marginal productivity and is thereby exploited (Robinson 1933) ; this a fortiori holds of pure monopsony (one employer, many laborers).
Pigou's measure of exploitation can be rewritten as E = (VMP -W)/W for normal, competitive labor markets, and E = (MRP -W)/W, for anomalous, noncompetitive ones, where E is the degree of exploitation, VMP is the value of the marginal product of labor, MRP is the marginal revenue product of labor, and W is the wage rate (Boal and Ransom 1996) . By making the charitable assumption of competitive labor markets, these two expressions will be used interchangeably, given the equalization of the value of marginal productivity and marginal revenue product (VMP = MRP) in such markets. This assumption can be especially indispensable insofar as Pigou's notion of exploitation, as a differential between wages and the physical marginal productivity of labor evaluated at its market price (i.e., the value of marginal product), applies only to pure or perfect competition in factor markets (Chamberlin 1948) .
In some interpretations, Pigou's measure applied to factor markets, especially monopsony, is deemed analogous to what Lerner (1955: 129) termed the index of the degree of monopoly power of a firm, calculated according to I = (P -MC)/P, where I is the index, P is the price, and MC is the marginal cost. (Clearly, the index of the degree of monopoly power is the higher, the more is the price in excess over marginal cost, and vice versa.) Such an index would be a measure of departures from perfect competition in product markets (Boal and Ransom 1996: 88) , with the substantial market power (share) of individual firms indicating monopolistic or imperfect competition (despite some misgivings, cf . Spulber 1996: 150) . In this regard, Pigou's measure of (factor) exploitation amounts to the inverse of labor supply elasticity or to wage flexibility with respect to changes in labor supply: E = e exponent-1, where e exponent-1 is the inverse of labor supply elasticity. Higher wage flexibility or elasticity would indicate higher exploitation, and vice versa. While this is intuitively obvious in the case of wage decreases responding to increases in labor supply or unemployment, it is less so in the opposite case of wage increases in response to labor scarcities. In this case, higher wage flexibility can, in fact, indicate lower rather than higher labor exploitation. 
Measuring (marginal) productivity
No doubt, marginal productivity is an empirically elusive concept. More generally, nonorthodox economists (Shaikh and Tonak 1994) have exposed the elusiveness of the neoclassical concept of productivity as such in relation to its Marxist counterpart. Their main argument is that the neoclassical concept of productivity and production involves a conflation, operationalized in conventional national accounts, between productive and nonproductive or consumption activities deemed also "productive." Arguably, the neoclassical concept of production is a "very elastic one, encompassing not only all results of potentially marketable human labor, but also the 'services' of durable goods and even the 'benefits' of leisure time" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 18) . Hence, the "basic problem arises from the fact that conventional accounts classify many activities as 'production,' when in fact they should be classified as forms of social consumption" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 2) , namely, the military, police, administration, trade, financial and legal services, and so forth. This can be termed the neoclassical paradox of the "productivity" of evidently nonproductive activities, with all such activities being regarded as "resulting in additional output" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 5) .
By contrast, the Marxist concept of productivity is defined in reference to productive activities only, which has implications for defining and measuring labor exploitation. For instance, Mohun (1996) , refuting the neoclassical criticisms of the Marxian distinction between productive and unproductive labor, uses this distinction to derive some implications for understanding Marx's rate of exploitation. Similarly, Kalmans (1997) retains the distinction between productive and nonproductive labor to distinguish the wages of productive workers or variable capital from aggregate wages that also include the salaries of unproductive workers. This distinction is also instrumental in distinguishing surplus value generated by productive labor from profits appropriated by capitalist entrepreneurs and thus in defining labor exploitation by the quantitative relation of surplus value to variable capital (S/V), rather than by the profit/wage ratio. Shaikh and Tonak (1994) distinguish between production and nonproduction activities in the American economy against a theoretical background involving categories such as productive labor, surplus value (exploitation), and profit, mapped in terms of money and labor value. In particular, they argue that conventional national-income accounts in the United States misclassify many forms of social consumption, including even military, police, and administrative services, as production. As an alternative to this misclassification, they analyze the U.S. economy providing empirical estimates of such variable categories as total, intermediate, and final product; employment; wages; variable capital; surplus value; surplus product; the rate of surplus value or the exploitation rate; the rate of profit; productivity; and the influence of the state on capital accumulation.
This article aims at demonstrating exploitation by using marginalist categories. It will, by applying a simplified Pigouvian framework, demonstrate that exploitation actually occurs within a (globalized) competitive market rather than being the effect of noncompetitive markets. Now, in reality, most capitalists and workers alike do not seem to think in marginal, differential, or incremental magnitudes, including marginal productivity, marginal utility, marginal value, marginal price, marginal costs, marginal revenues, and marginal profits. Even hard-line Austrian economists (e.g., Hayek) object that it is difficult to know what true marginalist variables (e.g., marginal costs) are in the real world of change, as distinguished from the static world of perfect competition and equilibrium models. Other Austrian economists such as Schumpeter (1991) observe that most businessmen, of course, do not know what a marginal cost and marginal revenue curve is; most of them would not know how to construct them even if they knew what they meant; and . . . not a single businessman's subjective processes are correctly described by saying that he is hunting for their point of intersection. (321) At this juncture, it is perhaps instructive to note that, more generally, Schumpeter and other Austrians are the only group of neoclassical economists who share Marx's notion of competition as a market process rather than as a set of conditions.
More recently, unorthodox economists (Botwinick 1993: 8) have demonstrated that using the classical Marxian analysis of capitalist competition between and within industries helps explain how such competition can actually sustain and accommodate systematic patterns of interindustry and intraindustry wage differentials among workers regardless of their levels of skill. Particularly, the analysis shows that such persistent patterns of wage differentials mostly ensue from the process of market competition and technological changes in the capitalist economy.
2 Notably, such patterns are conjoined with the continuing regeneration of a reserve army of unemployed labor forced to seek out employment at substandard (subsistence) wages and with the varying efforts of organized labor to raise wages within the strict limits defined by these differential conditions of production and profitability and by the constant downward pressures of the reserve army (Botwinick 1993: 8-9) . In sum, structural foundations for wage inequalities and by implication for labor exploitation in modern capitalism "are largely generated by the ongoing process of capitalist competition and technical change, the constant reproduction of a reserve army of labor, and uneven worker organization" (Botwinick 1993: 18) . Now, in a neoclassical framework, estimating wage differentials and thus labor exploitation (and for that matter, discrimination in the labor market 3 ) "depends on the ability to observe a measure of the individual's marginal productivity. Unfortunately, such data do not in general exist" (Arrow 1998: 96) . Nevertheless, marginal productivity can be reasonably approximated by data on overall productivity as an average variable (the average product). This seems justified in formal and substantial terms. Formally, the function of total product is an integral of the marginal productivity function as a derivative of the former, and the same applies to their monetary versions, namely, the value of marginal productivity and total revenue functions. Substantively, the level of total product reflects that of marginal productivity, at least before the "law" of diminishing marginal productivity (or decreasing returns) sets in, if ever (Sraffa 1960 ). On one hand, marginal and average productivity converge toward equivalence or proportionality, moving in the same direction in the sense that increases (decreases) in one are accompanied by increases (decreases) in another. And when the average product or productivity proper is constant, so is marginal productivity, which epitomizes constant returns as the (most) plausible assumption in classical political economy (Sraffa 1960) . On the other hand, data on wages are easily available and refer to hourly labor compensations. Tables 1 and 2 present data on productivity levels (in manufacturing or industry 4 ) and their changes over time in major capitalist countries. As Table 1 (for the 1960-89 period) and Table 2 (for 1990-98) show, developed capitalist countries converge on identical or comparable productivity levels, as measured by the average product (output per worker) in manufacturing, with U.S. levels being among the highest. To that extent, these countries display convergence in terms of marginal productivity as they do in overall productivity (the average product). Concerning the dynamics of productivity change, reportedly more than any other country, the United States has attained the productivity frontier over the sample period and generally "contributed positively to technical progress" (Ray and Desli 1997: 1039) . It seems that the United States has achieved one of the highest levels of productivity (static efficiency) and one of the most rapid rates of productivity growth (dynamic efficiency). Hence, one can infer that marginal productivity, or what Keynes termed marginal efficiency, is probably (among) the highest and the most rapidly growing in the United States. The neoclassical presumption of zero exploitation, namely, wages (W) = the marginal value productivity of labor (MPL), would then suggest that wages should be the highest (and most rapidly growing) in the United States relative to other capitalist countries. Data on wages in the United States and comparable countries shed additional light in this regard. Specifically, recent (from the late 1990s) levels of earnings per hour in the United States ($18.24) are lower than in many other industrial countries, especially those from northern Europe, with Germany featuring the highest ($28.28) and the United Kingdom the lowest ($15.47) rate (see Table 3 ).
No doubt, oftentimes productivity measures are debatable. Namely, there has been a debate (for a review, cf. Solow 1998) about whether there has really been a productivity revival and thereby resurgence in competitiveness (Hayes 1996) in the United States or elsewhere and even whether one can trust productivity measures at all. 6 In this connection, a 4. Data on wages from industry suggest that services and public sectors are excluded. Arguably, (marginal) productivity is easier to ascertain or estimate in industry, especially manufacturing (see productivity data in Tables 1 and 2), and thus wage-productivity comparisons more suitable, than in services and public sectors. In addition, using industry wages can be considered congruous with the concept of productive (vs. unproductive) labor.
5. Other studies (e.g., Wolff 1996) report somewhat different data on productivity growth, or rather productivity slowdown assumed to be largely due to capital vintage effects, in advanced countries, but this does not greatly affect the crux of the argument made here.
6. Also, this debate is tied with that about the way in which the consumer price index (CPI) is calculated (Roach 1998 ). On the basis of an alleged upward bias or overstatement of inflation (0.7-0.8 percent per year) in the current CPI, neoclassical economists (Boskin and Jorgenson 1997: 89) argue that, during 1973-95, "instead of falling by 13 percent, real average hourly earnings have risen 13 percent." Such revisions or reconstructions of the past seem dubious; in economic theory, such tendencies can reflect Whiggism or Whig history: "one reads one's history backwards from the present" (Caldwell 1997 (Caldwell : 1886 . The alleged upward bias in the CPI as a key major issue is how to evaluate the role of computer investments, that is, the computerdriven productivity boom (Baker 1998).
Estimating labor exploitation rates
Assuming that productivity levels are roughly identical or comparable, the difference between worker earnings per hour in the United States and those in other countries can serve as a rough estimate for their differences in labor exploitation. For example, if the United States and Germany have comparable levels of (average and marginal) productivity (as shown in Tables 1 and 2 ) but differ by some magnitude ($28-$18) in the hourly wage rate, this magnitude would ceteris paribus (abstracting from their price levels) give the estimated difference in labor exploitation.
To be sure, neoclassical economists would claim that the problem is that German wages are too high and not that U.S. wages are too low, that is, that labor exploitation exists here. Their "proof" that German wages are too high would be the higher unemployment or joblessness rate in today's Germany, arguing that German labor unions (and SocialDemocratic politicians) have pushed W > MPL and thus created a persistent unemployment problem. Although seductive, this argument seems weak because it neglects the fact that despite Germany's (and generally Europe's) postwar commitment to high wages (Davis 1998) , and America's to low wages, the employment rate in the former has been historically lower than in the latter (Nickell 1997) , with the exception of some recent periods. Moreover, during 1979 through 1995, Germany had a lower average unemployment rate (e.g., 5.8 percent between 1979 and 1989 and 5.7 percent between 1989 and 1995) than the United States (7.2 percent and 6.2 percent, respectively), so over this period, Germany "should not be viewed as a high unemployment-rate country relative to the United States" (Beaudry and Green 2003: 572) and despite wages being higher in the former than in the latter. (Incidentally, this would suggest that Germany's unemployment problems during the 1990s might be largely associated with reunification.) For instance, in 1990, hourly manufacturing wages were $21.88 in Germany and $14.91 in the United States, in 1995, $32.22 Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994).
inflation measure may be far from empirically certain, given that "for some of the sources of bias, the evidence is based on case studies of a small number of commodities. The difference between estimates seem to be largely determined by the willingness of experts to extrapolate from these case studies to estimates for broader categories of goods" (Moulton 1996: 160) . (Nickell 1997: 58) Such evidence seems to invalidate the neoclassical assumption that higher wages are invariably associated with greater joblessness, that a higher unemployment rate is a proof that these wages are too high. This refutes the implied orthodox argument that too high wages necessarily exceed the marginal productivity of labor (W > MPL) and are thus some kind of inefficiency wages in terms of unemployment. On the contrary, too high wages can be equal to, as in the case of zero exploitation, and even lower than the marginal productivity of labor, which implies nonzero exploitation as a more realistic proposition from the stance of radical political economics. If West Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and Scandinavian countries have reportedly (especially since the 1960s) experienced both higher wages and lower unemployment rates than the United States, then on the neoclassical argument, such wages have not been pushed beyond the marginal productivity threshold. This indicates how empirically implausible, although ideologically and politically functional (especially for those orthodox economists defending low wages in the United States), it is to treat high wages in these countries as economically arbitrary and inefficient (reflecting W > MPL) and thus as necessarily causing unemployment and retarding economic growth. Relatedly, the positive covariance between the rate of labor exploitation and the unemployment rate, that is, Cov (exploitation, joblessness) > 0, would eliminate neoclassical criticism. This holds insofar as such a covariance indicates an underlying link of the degree of exploitation to the condition of the labor market, namely, the perpetual existence of a reserve army of labor. Contrary to neoclassical presuppositions, exploitation, like wage disparity, would be a normal state rather than an aberration of the market economy, namely, free competition and capital accumulation, with its inherent tendency toward the "constant reproduction of a reserve army of labor" (Botwinick 1993: 18) . This continual reproduction of the reserve army of labor in turn has crucial consequences for worker mobility and interindustry and intraindustry wage differentiation and by implication for labor exploitation (Botwinick 1993: 19) . The observed covariance between exploitation and unemployment rates in 1997 is found to be positive (see Table 5 ), as indicated by Pearson correlation (.097). In turn, many neoclassical economists might subscribe to the Marxian thesis that the rate of labor exploitation varies directly with direct foreign investment (DFI), that is, Cov (exploitation, DFI) > 0 (Shaikh 1979) . Here (Table 5) , the observed covariance between the exploitation rate and DFI is also positive as suggested by Pearson correlation (.303).
In fact, the past experience of West Germany and many other European countries suggests the feasibility and even superiority of a "high-wage path to economic growth and development" (Altman 1998) , that is, to lower unemployment, rather than a path of low wages or "wageless growth" (Gordon 1996b ) as traversed by the United States in recent decades, including the "wageless recovery" of the 1990s and the early 2000s.
On the assumption of equivalent or comparable productivity levels, and applying the productivity-wage equation, the highest hourly wage would indicate or proximate the amount of the marginal value productivity (or marginal revenue product, assuming competitive factor markets) of labor. This procedure thus assumes no exploitation in the country: Germany, for example, with the highest hourly earnings as a benchmark. No doubt, it is unrealistic and even nonsensical to assume that German workers are not exploited. Yet this is just a theoretical assumption or methodological device in the sense of Weberian ideal types allowing comparisons with real types or the actual rates of exploitation in other countries. To be sure, such an assumption of zero exploitation is rather arbitrary, but such is the zeropoint itself in most measurements. But if the goal is to compare these degrees of exploitation across countries, then creating a benchmark in this way is useful and appropriate. Such a procedure can be defended on grounds that, given comparable productivity levels, the highest (hourly) wage is at least the closest approximation, if not reflection, of the value of marginal product. As the minimum, the highest wage would thus indicate the lowest rate of labor exploitation, thus being less exploitative than other wages. Furthermore, an increasingly globalizing economy tends to increase the probability of convergence in productivity among developed countries such as the United States, Germany, and Japan. Hence, the role of global competition in increasing such convergence strengthens the case for taking German productivity levels/wages as the assumed (though imperfect) standard of zero exploitation. Now, the differential between the highest earnings and others would serve as a simple although proximate estimate of comparative exploitation in different countries. For exam- Table 3 . In general, the closer a national hourly wage is to the highest rate ($28.28) and thus to the proximate marginal productivity level (assuming constant returns or constant average/ marginal products), the lower the rate of exploitation, and vice versa. Using this criterion, the German labor market would be by assumption (though not in reality) devoid of exploitation, that is, with a zero rate. In turn, the United States would have one of the highest exploitation rates (0.550) among major industrial economies, alongside Great Britain (0.828), Australia (0.767), Canada (0.709), Italy (0.689), and France (0.574), with all the other countries having lower rates. Evidently, "differential conditions of exploitation and large groups of extremely low paid workers continue to exist within every major capitalist nation today" (Botwinick 1993: 18) .
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The U.S. exploitation rate, expressing the differential between actual wages and the estimated marginal productivity of labor, suggests that American workers are paid far less than their productive contribution or than their efficiency wages. Specifically, the exploitation rate (0.550) indicates that the value of unpaid hourly labor ($28.28 -$18.24 = $10.04) constitutes 55 percent of American workers' actual wage rates ($18.24) . (Other exploitation rates can also be interpreted in this way.)
In the neoclassical model, homogeneity or convergence in marginal productivity would imply uniformity in labor exploitation rates via the process of international factor-price equalization. However, judging from the significant wage differentials (as shown in Table 5) between developed countries, it seems that international factor-price equalization in the form of W = MPL does not necessarily follow, or at best lags behind, the marginal productivity equalization or convergence. (Furthermore, factor-price equalization has been virtually absent between the developed and developing world, as demonstrated by Thurow [1998] .) The result of such wage divergence, especially between American capitalism and north-European mixed systems (welfare states), has thus been different exploitation rates in different industrial countries.
Alternatively, international factor-price equalization has proceeded in a direction (W < MPL) opposite to that assumed by neoclassical economics (W = MPL) so that most capitalist countries tend to pay labor less than its (marginal) productivity, although they still differ in how much less. Hence, the assumption of differential exploitation rates in the presence of homogeneous or convergent marginal productivity levels is plausible insofar as in different countries, labor is paid at different levels relative to its (marginal) productivity due to institutional-structural and other extraeconomic factors. For example, American, German, and Japanese workers can be homogenous or convergent in marginal-productivity terms and yet receive different wages, thus experiencing different exploitation rates, owing to the differences in the social and institutional structure of labor markets in these countries. Thus, political and institutional factors play a critical role in the actual development of concrete wage patterns . . . and explain why the relative wages of [manufacturing and service] workers are far lower in the United States when compared to Germany and Japan. (Botwinick 1993: 263) Finally, Table 4 seems to indicate that the trend toward an increasing differential of productivity and wage rates in the United States continues since the 1980s, with the implication that the venerable rule of efficiency wages or zero exploitation becomes more and more an exception.
From Table 4 , one can see that during the recent business cycle 1990-98, the annual percentage growth of (marginal) productivity was 1.2 percent and that of real hourly compensation only 0.6 percent. Furthermore, the same trend is observed during the current recovery in which the economy has been characterized as being the "best in generations": the annual growth of (marginal) productivity of 1.3 percent and that of real hourly compensation of 0.7 percent. These tendencies in the current business cycle/recovery appear déjà vu, as they follow a pattern established during the prior cycle. Thus, during the 1980-90 business cycle, productivity grew by 1.2 percent and real hourly compensation by 0.5 percent per annum. Moreover, the discrepancy between the two was more pronounced during the 1982-1990 recovery: the annual growth rate of productivity was 1.3 percent and that of real hourly compensation 0.4 percent.
Making Sense of Labor Exploitation in Modern (American) Capitalism
For many radical political economists, the main explanation for the persistence and increase of labor exploitation, that is, the productivity-wage gap , experienced in recent decades by most U.S. workers, is that ostensibly pure American capitalism is permeated by a certain social structure of capital accumulation (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1990 ) that has been responsible for the perpetuation, sometimes the exacerbation, and sometimes the alleviation of exploitation (and income inequality). As regards the alleviation of labor, cases in point include such social-or citizen-wage components as welfare, unemployment insurance, social insurance, and related government expenditures, to the extent that they, by decreasing the cost of being jobless, alleviate exploitation.
However, other radical political economists (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 137-41) seem to contend the opposite, by arguing that the social wage is in fact negative rather than positive and thus that government does not necessarily or substantially alleviate labor exploitation. In this connection, they use the concept of the net transfer between workers (wage and salary earners) and the state, defining this concept as the difference between benefits received by labor and taxes paid, that is, between "social welfare expenditures directed toward the working class and taxes taken out of the flow of employee compensation" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 356-67) . Notably, they report estimates of the net transfer between workers and the state for the United States during the 1952-85 period, indicating that the transfer is negative over most of the period, as workers "paid more in taxes than they received in social benefit expenditures" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 141) . For example, their calculations for 1964 show that the total benefits and income (social welfare expenditures) received by American workers were $68 billion and the total taxes paid by them $76.2 billion, which indicates a negative net transfer between labor and the government of more than $8 billions (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 358, table N.1) . Hence, they infer that such a negative transfer actually amounts to a net tax on American workers (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 356) . In consequence, the true rate of surplus value becomes "generally higher" (Shaikh and Tonak 1994: 141) , suggesting further exacerbation rather than alleviation of the degree of exploitation.
In the United States, particularly consequential for labor exploitation have been structural arrangements and institutional changes (Gordon 1998) , such as the declining unionization rate, the conservative push toward government deregulation, and the decreasing minimum wage in real terms (Fortin and Lemieux 1997) . Notably, "countries like the United States that have some of the lowest levels of unionization are also likely to exhibit the highest levels of wage inequality" (Botwinick 1993: 263) and by implication labor exploitation. In turn, European labor markets are reported to be characterized and governed by four institutional layers that are deemed instrumental in keeping labor exploitation low and unemployment high relative to the United States. Included in these layers are the operation of political-institutional factors in labor market processes, constitutional provisions governing income distribution, the nature of legal systems overall, and the organization of unemployment insurance (Siebert 1997: 39) .
In retrospect, it seems as if the recent history of American capitalism, especially its permutation into Reaganomics since the 1980s, tended to replicate or perpetuate what Keynes (1960) identified as the "two outstanding faults" of capitalism prior to World War II, namely, its "failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes" (375-81). In the 1980s and 1990s, the first failure plagued European welfare capitalist societies and the second American laissez-faire capitalism, although this latter also failed to attain full employment in the strict sense. And contrary to conventional wisdom in the United States, whereas the latter features substantially more labor exploitation, as well as income inequity, 7 than any other industrial country, it is far from being a leader (or outlier) in socioeconomic mobility. 8 7. As is well known, "no other developed country has witnessed such a dramatic increase in inequality [as a result of which] wages and income are distributed more inequitably in the U.S. than in any other OECD country" (Topel 1997: 55) .
8. Reportedly, U.S. mobility rates are similar to those of France, Italy, Sweden, and other European societies. The moment that the United States has a higher degree of decentralization (Alesina and Perroti 1997) of its labor market than the United Kingdom does not necessarily translate into higher levels of economic mobility. Alternatively, a higher degree of centralization of wage-setting institutions in continental European countries such as Germany, Austria, and Scandinavia does not carry over into less mobility in these countries than in the United States (Gottschalk 1997) , as most American conservative politicians, ideologues, and overly-patriotic or "Christian social scientists" think.
This second failure of capitalism is further amplified by most recent tendencies in labor exploitation within the American economy, that is, increasing discrepancies between U.S. productivity and earnings, in further violation of the productivity rule of no exploitation. Reportedly, in modern, particularly ruthless American capitalism, there have been "dramatic increases in the wage-productivity gap-the divergence between the growth rates of aggregate [and thus marginal] productivity and real wages-in the post-1981 period"
9 (Ferguson 1996: 77) , at the expense of wages. In retrospect, these tendencies have been associated with a period of the resurgence of economic conservatism (the new Right) in major capitalist economies, including what Keynes would term financial Puritanism, as exemplified by Reaganomics in the United States and Thatcherism 10 in the United Kingdom. In an empirical study, Kalmans (1997) showed that for most of the postwar period, the United States experienced a higher level and faster growth of its rate of surplus value (SV)/ exploitation than did Japan. A major factor for this has been the falling rate of profitability in the United States. For example, the rate of profit has recovered just 40 percent of the previous decrease during the 1960s and 1970s (Moseley 1997: 23) . In turn, this has been due to the increasing share of unproductive labor in SV. Reportedly, the "main reason for the lack of a more significant increase in the rate of profit is a continued increase in the relative proportion of unproductive labor [in the United States]" (Moseley 1997: 23) . In response, U.S. companies have increased the rate of labor exploitation to compensate for this loss of SV. So long as this loss of SV continues, one can expect that U.S. companies will further increase the exploitation rate in the future (a similar argument is made by Gordon 1996a) insofar as the fate of American corporate capitalism hinges increasingly on the profit rate (Moseley 1997) and thus on worker exploitation.
In turn, workers' bargaining strength and thus labor's positional or institutional power (Gordon 1998; Howell 1999; Perrone 1984) is inversely related to the fear of losing their jobs (Screpanti 1996) , with this fear increasing as the unemployment rate increases. In such a situation, labor exploitation or exploitative employment appears to most workers as a lesser evil than involuntary joblessness. This seems to particularly apply to American workers who are forced, in the absence of a social net comparable to that in most developed countries, to make a "choice" between involuntary joblessness and ruthless exploitation, choosing the second because at least they have "jobs." In turn, American workers' acceptance of virtually any available jobs (recently, largely part-time, low-paid ones) seems to give an almost unfettered "license to exploit" to capitalist corporations making the U.S. freeenterprise system "the utopia (becoming a reality) of unlimited exploitation" (Bourdieu 1998: 94) . The outcome is a vicious circle in which the fear of joblessness and labor exploitation reinforce each other.
As with labor exploitation, the fear of losing jobs is more pervasive in the United States than any other country, given the permanent revolution of restructuring and downsizing of American companies, of which prime victims are regularly workers and their jobs, with the stock market celebrating such victimization. Such "corporate squeeze of working Americans" (Gordon 1996a ) thus dispels the myth of managerial downsizing by increasingly "fat" and "mean" American corporations. No wonder American workers' already weak bargaining strength has further plummeted in recent years.
11 The breakdown of the U.S. postwar system of labor relations, namely, the capital-labor accord, was hastened by opportunistic attacks by American capital on labor (Nilsson 1996) . All this sheds light both on the increasing job insecurity and on the high rate of labor exploitation in the American economy.
Based on data from Table 3 , an empirical generalization is that exploitation rates are comparatively the highest in what can be termed Anglo-Saxon capitalism (the United Kingdom, United States, Canada, Australia). In turn, exploitation rates appear lower in European welfare states, that is, in most countries of northern Europe. It would seem that the more an economy is laissez-faire, capitalistic, and decentralized, the higher is the exploitation rate, and vice versa. Specifically, laissez-faire, capitalistic, and decentralized economies characterized by enterprise-level wage negotiations such as the United States, as well as the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia, have higher exploitation rates than centralized welfare (e.g., Scandinavian) states having economy-wide negotiation with government involvement and those (Germany, Holland, and Belgium) at intermediate levels with industry-based bargaining (Alesina and Perroti 1997: 930) . The overall finding is thus that laissez-faire capitalism is comparatively more exploitative than its welfare state/corporatist forms. This would suggest that an unregulated and unfettered labor market, of the sort extolled by neoclassical orthodoxy, tends to generate greater exploitation rates than do other markets. In the absence of pertinent and balanced government and other social regulation of its operation, such a market appears to give capitalist employers virtually unrestricted freedom to exploit laborers given the asymmetrical power of capital and labor, particularly in countries such as the United States. The fact that a laissez-faire economy rests on such freedom of exploitation of labor by capital helps one understand the advocacy of "free enterprise" on the part of capitalists and their political representatives and conservative ideologues (Botwinick 1993: 256) . However, what all these groups defend as Adam Smith's "natural system of liberty," driven by individual freedom, initiative, and responsibility, laborers experience as both Leviathan and anarchy (Buchanan 1975) , that is, as systemic overcontrol and the license to be exploited within some sort of Hobbesian antisocial state and thus "trapped in a modern jungle" (Botwinick 1993: 120n) . Conditions of persistent labor superexploitation in myriad U.S. industries (garments, electronics, poultry, etc.) are thus a "remainder of the worst kinds of abuse that can take place within the 'free labor markets' of modern capitalism" (Botwinick 1993: 119-20) . Hence, contrary to economic orthodoxy, laissez-faire capitalism or America's free-enterprise system displays an intrinsic tendency to generate and perpetuate higher rates of labor exploitation than other social systems, especially welfare states, as free (labor and consumer) markets "often work blindly, cruelly and exploitatively-and thus create the paradox of freedom in principle and lack of freedom in practice" (Smelser 1997: 78) .
At this juncture, the question can arise as to whether having a strong welfare state or centralized bargaining transforms a society into a less capitalistic one or merely a different form of capitalism. The second answer seems more plausible to the extent that the economy remains essentially privately owned and controlled. On this account, even countries with strong welfare states such as, for example, Germany and Sweden, qualify as capitalist, given the dominance of private ownership and control of the means of production. In this regard, such societies can be characterized by the category of welfare capitalism as distinguished from its laissez-faire counterpart (Esping-Andersen 1994).
Conclusions
Most neoclassical economists usually limit exploitation optimistically to monopsonic (one-employer) labor markets as opposed to competitive markets, and while allowing that it is probably widespread, still they estimate it as but small on the average. In their view, even in monopsony (e.g., nursing, coal mining) the rate of exploitation is likely to be just a "little higher" than a small value (0.03 or 0.04), as estimated on the basis of the long-run elasticity of wages with respect to labor supply and firm size, that is, the inverse elasticity of labor supply, a greater elasticity signifying higher exploitation (Boal and Ransom 1996) . Moreover, it is claimed that the rates of exploitation arising from labor supply frictions "are lower than, say, union relative wage effects or marginal income tax rates faced by U.S. workers" (Boal and Ransom 1996: 112) .
Overall, this article demonstrates evidence against the neoclassical assumption of factor returns based on marginal productivity or, more accurately, productivity in general. This evidence invalidates the neoclassical presumption of nonexistent or negligible exploitation in labor markets assumedly governed by the rule of (marginal) productivity and the law of (labor) supply and demand of wage formation. Instead, it lends support to the argument that labor exploitation exists and persists, with tendencies for further increases rather than diminution.
Specifically, the data indicate that the degree of labor exploitation in the American economy is one of the highest among industrial countries. They suggest that U.S. workers are probably more exploited on average than those in most other developed economies (especially north-European welfare states). To that extent, American workers can be considered to have fewer economic rights than those in most other advanced countries. Yet this may well in the long run backfire against the U.S. economy insofar as worker rights, including collective bargaining rights, employment protection, and income security, tend to promote productivity growth (Buchele and Christiansen 1999) and vice versa. In this sense, labor exploitation "is costly and its reduction compatible with-if not necessary for-a return to economic security and opportunity" (Bowles, Gordon, and Weisskopf 1990: 14) .
At this juncture, the recent discovery of Third World-like sweatshops in the United States is perhaps not accidental, given the persistent tendency to increasing labor exploitation and to reducing worker rights in American capitalism for decades. More particularly, conditions of labor "super-exploitation are reappearing in the modern U.S. economy as sweatshops conditions are rapidly becoming the competitive standard in the growing garment and electronic industries" (Botwinick 1993: 119) . However, the existence and persistence, especially in the long run, of labor exploitation represents a puzzle or mystery for pure neoclassical economics (with exceptions such as Pigou 12 ), although not for Marxian or radical economics, of course. In neoclassical economics, labor exploitation is virtually impossible under the assumption of necessary equivalence or proportionality between wages and the marginal value productivity of labor and generally between distributive shares (incomes) and marginal productivities (Walras 1926: 375) .
Mainstream economics, especially its American version, treats the problem of exploitation as an almost taboo theme, for largely doctrinarian, ideological, or political reasons, thus amounting to a mathematical politics (Rosenberg 1996) . In consequence, such economics often appears as a "vast multi-parti coloured mathematical balloon" (Robertson 1952 ) filled in with head-in-the-sand theories oblivious of the reality of labor exploitation and related phenomena (e.g., rampant income dispersions). At best, the phenomenon of labor exploitation is implausibly confined to pathological market structures, such as monopsony and other monopolids, with the underlying implication that the normal, perfectly competitive market is free of such anomalies (a curious assumption of a dual economy). However, the present analysis suggests that labor exploitation is pervasive, regardless of whether the factor market is dominated by free atomistic competition or pure monopsony and its mutants, for example, imperfect or monopolistic factor competition, duopsony, and oligopsony.
For much of orthodox economics, the puzzle is why real (and sometimes nominal) wages in countries such as the United States have declined in the past two decades, despite productivity/economic growth and skill-based technological change. Neoclassical economists predict that technological change will increase the demand for more productive workers, thus raising wages. However, the unbearable lightness of such an elementary textbook vision seems to imply a conflation between actual phenomena and theory-driven facts, that is, those "statements about reality that are selected, interpreted, or simply created to confirm a vision of the way things work" (Howell 1999: 54) . Furthermore, such conventional "skillintensive technological shift" explanations of the decline in real wages and growing income dispersion in the United States reportedly are "not supported by the empirical evidence" (Thurow 1998: 25) . In consequence, nonorthodox economists propose alternative explanations of the growth in U.S. wage inequality that are based on sharply different structural-institutional (or Gordonian, as called by Howell 1999) visions of the labor market. By centering on labor exploitation and its institutional-structural factors, this article has attempted to explain why the average wage has not kept pace with, and implicitly why income inequality cannot be solely explained by, productivity growth and technological progress, especially the computer-driven productivity boom, in the United States and elsewhere.
No doubt, the elaboration and (in)validation of the political-institutional explanation of labor exploitation in the United States and other capitalist economies needs more theoretical analysis and empirical research alike. Future analysis and research should reexamine the association between the degree of factor exploitation and the social-institutional structure of labor markets, a structure that in turn makes these specific social institutions. Of particular pertinence for future studies is the covariation between worker exploitation (as well as income inequity) and the capital-labor imbalance at the expense of the latter in terms of institutional or positional power. Thus, in recent years, American labor vis-à-vis capital has been subject to "a mode of domination of a new kind, based on the creation of a generalized and permanent state of insecurity aimed at forcing workers into submission, into the acceptance of exploitation [i.e., flexploitation]"
13 (Bourdieu 1998: 85) . From the perspective of radical political (or sociological) economics, there would be no mystery in regard to labor exploitation (and declining real wages) in the United States during the 1980s and 1990s. The decline in real wages, as well as increasing income inequality, may be largely attributed to the increase in the rate of labor exploitation in the American economy. One can assume that this later phenomenon has been a result of the specific institutional arrangement of the American labor market, that is, the social structure of capital accumulation. In this connection, singularly pertinent has been the impact of power (Gordon 1998) and related political factors, including the American state (Shaikh and Tonak 1994) , on capital accumulation and thus on the nature and operation of labor markets in the United States. Generally, in historical terms, long before there was any market, exchange transactions were subject to the rules of those in power.
[Moreover] all institutional factors which determine the structure of the market, even the whole economic system, can be changed if those interested in change have enough political power. (Myrdal 1953: 197) This seems to particularly apply to American capitalism as the utopia-turned-reality of "unlimited exploitation" (Bourdieu 1998: 94) .
Specifically, the U.S. economic system, especially its labor market, is one with the probably most asymmetric power relations between labor and capital among all advanced capitalist countries at the expense of labor, with the result that American workers have probably fewer economic liberties and rights than their counterparts in most Western societies. Hence, economic democracy, as found in many continental European societies, is virtually nonexistent or a taboo in the American economy, but that is a theme for another analysis.
